Weaponizing Maritime Chokepoints: Sea Lane Denial, Geoeconomic Coercion, and Regional Security in the Red Sea, 2023–2026

Abstract

Between November 2023 and August 2026, the Red Sea transformed from shared commercial infrastructure into an instrument of statecraft. This article examines how non-state actors weaponized maritime chokepoints through sea lane denial, geoeconomic coercion, and licensing mechanisms. Using structured case analysis of the Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal with empirical data from the Suez Canal Authority, IMF PortWatch, war-risk insurance premiums, and Central Bank of Egypt records, we identify four key mechanisms of denial escalation and their distributional consequences. Primary findings: (1) denial operates through pricing mechanisms rather than kinetic destruction—insurance market repricing removed 50% of Suez throughput despite minimal vessel losses; (2) denial capability has decoupled from naval capability, enabling non-state actors to impose system-wide costs; (3) coercers have migrated from denial toward licensing, converting transit rights into conditional permissions; (4) hedging strategies relocate rather than reduce exposure within contested regional systems. The study demonstrates that insurance markets function as the primary transmission mechanism for chokepoint coercion and that the licensing drift represents a durable normative shift in international maritime security. Implications for Pakistan and other trade-dependent economies are substantial and require strategic reserve depth, contractual diversification, and diplomatic engagement with transit norms.